Towards Smart Hybrid Fuzzing for Smart Contracts

Smart contracts are Turing-complete programs that are executed across a blockchain network. Unlike traditional programs, once deployed they cannot be modified. As smart contracts become more popular and carry more value, they become more of an interesting target for attackers. In recent years, smart contracts suffered major exploits, costing millions of dollars, due to programming errors. As a result, a variety of tools for detecting bugs has been proposed. However, majority of these tools often yield many false positives due to over-approximation or poor code coverage due to complex path constraints. Fuzzing or fuzz testing is a popular and effective software testing technique. However, traditional fuzzers tend to be more effective towards finding shallow bugs and less effective in finding bugs that lie deeper in the execution. In this work, we present CONFUZZIUS, a hybrid fuzzer that combines evolutionary fuzzing with constraint solving in order to execute more code and find more bugs in smart contracts. Evolutionary fuzzing is used to exercise shallow parts of a smart contract, while constraint solving is used to generate inputs which satisfy complex conditions that prevent the evolutionary fuzzing from exploring deeper paths. Moreover, we use data dependency analysis to efficiently generate sequences of transactions, that create specific contract states in which bugs may be hidden. We evaluate the effectiveness of our fuzzing strategy, by comparing CONFUZZIUS with state-of-the-art symbolic execution tools and fuzzers. Our evaluation shows that our hybrid fuzzing approach produces significantly better results than state-of-the-art symbolic execution tools and fuzzers

Applying Private Information Retrieval to Lightweight Bitcoin Clients

Lightweight Bitcoin clients execute a Simple Payment Verification (SPV) protocol to verify the validity of transactions related to a particular user. Currently, lightweight clients use Bloom filters to significantly reduce the amount of bandwidth required to validate a particular transaction. This is despite the fact that research has shown that Bloom filters are insufficient at preserving the privacy of clients' queries. In this paper we describe our design of an SPV protocol that leverages Private Information Retrieval (PIR) to create fully private and performant queries. We show that our protocol has a low bandwidth and latency cost; properties that make our protocol a viable alternative for lightweight Bitcoin clients and other cryptocurrencies with a similar SPV model. In contract to Bloom filters, our PIR-based approach offers deterministic privacy to the user. Among our results, we show that in the worst case, clients who would like to verify 100 transactions occurring in the past week incurs a bandwidth cost of 33.54 MB with an associated latency of approximately 4.8 minutes, when using our protocol. The same query executed using the Bloom-filter-based SPV protocol incurs a bandwidth cost of 12.85 MB; this is a modest overhead considering the privacy guarantees it provides

Time to Bribe: Measuring Block Construction Market

With the emergence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), block construction markets on blockchains have evolved into a competitive arena. Following Ethereum's transition from Proof of Work (PoW) to Proof of Stake (PoS), the Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism has emerged as the dominant force in the Ethereum block construction market. This paper presents an in-depth longitudinal study of the Ethereum block construction market, spanning from the introduction of PoS and PBS in September 2022 to May 2023. We analyze the market shares of builders and relays, their temporal changes, and the financial dynamics within the PBS system, including payments among builders and block proposers -- commonly referred to as bribes. We introduce an MEV-time law quantifying the expected MEV revenue wrt. the time elapsed since the last proposed block. We provide empirical evidence that moments of crisis (e.g. the FTX collapse, USDC stablecoin de-peg) coincide with significant spikes in MEV payments compared to the baseline. Despite the intention of the PBS architecture to enhance decentralization by separating actor roles, it remains unclear whether its design is optimal. Implicit trust assumptions and conflicts of interest may benefit particular parties and foster the need for vertical integration. MEV-Boost was explicitly designed to foster decentralization, causing the side effect of enabling risk-free sandwich extraction from unsuspecting users, potentially raising concerns for regulators

Mitigating Decentralized Finance Liquidations with Reversible Call Options

Liquidations in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) are both a blessing and a curse -- whereas liquidations prevent lenders from capital loss, they simultaneously lead to liquidation spirals and system-wide failures. Since most lending and borrowing protocols assume liquidations are indispensable, there is an increased interest in alternative constructions that prevent immediate systemic-failure under uncertain circumstances. In this work, we introduce reversible call options, a novel financial primitive that enables the seller of a call option to terminate it before maturity. We apply reversible call options to lending in DeFi and devise Miqado, a protocol for lending platforms to replace the liquidation mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, Miqado is the first protocol that actively mitigates liquidations to reduce the risk of liquidation spirals. Instead of selling collateral, Miqado incentivizes external entities, so-called supporters, to top-up a borrowing position and grant the borrower additional time to rescue the debt. Our simulation shows that Miqado reduces the amount of liquidated collateral by 89.82% in a worst-case scenario